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This paper investigates the historical origins of the notion of incommensurability in con-
temporary philosophy of science. The aim is not to establish claims of priority, but to enhance
our understanding of the notion by illuminating the various issues that contributed to its
development. Kuhn developed his notion of incommensurability primarily under the influence
of Fleck, Polanyi, and Köhler. Feyerabend, who had developed his notion more than a decade
earlier, drew directly from Duhem, who had developed a notion of incommensurability in
1906. The idea is that in the course of scientific advance, when fundamental theories change,
meanings change, which can result in a new conception of the nature of reality. Feyerabend
repeatedly used this notion of incommensurability to attack various forms of conceptual con-
servativism. These include the logical positivists foundational use of protocol statements, Hei-
senbergs methodological principle that established results must be presupposed by all further
research, attempts to separate philosophical accounts of ontology from physics, Bohrs prin-
ciple of complementarity, and logical empiricist accounts of reduction and explanation. Focus-
ing on the function of the notion of incommensurability common to Feyerabends various
critiques explicates Feyerabends early philosophy as a series of challenges to forms of concep-
tual conservativism.
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Ludwik Fleck.1. Introduction
The notion of incommensurability has undoubtedly been one of themajor themes in
the history and philosophy of science in the last half-century.1 As Thomas Kuhn and
Paul Feyerabend are commonly credited with introducing this provocative idea in
independent publications in 1962, it may come as a surprise to learn that Feyerabend
had developed his notion of incommensurability more than a decade prior to the pub-
lication ofKuhnsThe structure of scientific revolutions. However, the idea is even older
than that.
This paper begins with a brief examination of the historical origins of Kuhns
notion of incommensurability. The goal is not to determine the relation between
Kuhns notion of incommensurability and that of his predecessors. (That would
be at least an essay in itself.) Rather, the point is merely to emphasize the signif-
icant similarities and differences between Kuhn and Feyerabends routes to their
notions. The main bulk of the paper chronicles the less well known story of Fey-
erabends development of his notion of incommensurability. The aim is not to
establish claims of priority, but to enhance our understanding of the notion.
By examining its historical origins, and by exploring the various issues that con-
tributed to Feyerabends development of it, the paper attempts to contribute to a
clearer understanding of the idea and its philosophical significance. As we shall
see, the main issues that shaped Feyerabends development of the notion of
incommensurability prior to 1962 include a contextual theory of meaning and Ge-
stalt psychology. He refined the idea in attacks on the logical positivists founda-
tional use of protocol statements, Heisenbergs methodological principle that
established results must be presupposed by all further research, attempts to
separate philosophical accounts of ontology from physics, Bohrs principle of
complementarity, and logical empiricist accounts of reduction and explanation.
Focusing on the function of the notion of incommensurability common to
Feyerabends various critiques explicates Feyerabends early philosophy as a series
of challenges to forms of conceptual conservativism based on the idea that in the
course of scientific advance, when fundamental theories change, meanings change,
which can result in a new conception of the nature of reality.22. The origins of Kuhn’s notion of incommensurability (1962)
In independent 1962 publications, both Feyerabend and Kuhn used the term
incommensurable to describe certain aspects of dramatic theoretical transitions in1 See the incommensurability bibliography in Hoyningen-Huene & Sankey (2001).
2 For a more comprehensive account of Feyerabends early philosophy, see Oberheim (forthcoming).
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mensurable is the product of conversations between Kuhn and Feyerabend that
took place in Berkeley, California, on Telegraph Avenue around 1960 (Hacking,
1983, p. 67). However, although Feyerabend had read and extensively commented
on a draft of Kuhn (1970a [1962]) in 1960/1961,4 Feyerabend had independently
developed his notion of incommensurability, and had even independently been using
the term incommensurable.5
Kuhn initially used the term to capture methodological, observational, and con-
ceptual disparities between successive scientific paradigms that he had encountered
in his historical investigations of the natural sciences (Kuhn, 1970a [1962], pp.
148–150).6 Later, he used the idea to argue that there is translation failure due to dif-
ferences in the taxonomic structures of successive scientific theories.7 Kuhns devel-
oping notion of incommensurability has received much attention, and it continues to
provoke plenty of discussion.8
According to Kuhn, he arrived at the notion of incommensurability sometime in
the mid to late 1940s as a graduate student, while attempting to understand what at
first appeared to be nonsensical passages that he encountered in Aristotles physics.9
However, the notion of incommensurability is conspicuously lacking from Kuhn
(1957), and Kuhn has been accused (by various sources) of having borrowed the idea
(from various sources) without having given them their due credit.
For example, Agassi recently claimed that Kuhn borrowed the idea from Du-
hem, and that Kuhn ignored his debt to Duhem (Agassi, 2002, p. 409). In addition,
according to Agassi, Kuhn denied (in a personal communication) ever having read
Duhem. Agassi argues that this is highly implausible, as all members of Conants cir-
cle, such as Kuhn, were familiar with Duhems work. Thus, Agassi is puzzled by
Kuhns claim that incommensurability was the central innovation of his famous
1962 book, as the word [incommensurability] denotes an important idea that Du-
hem explained in some detail. It is that we do not forget old theories even after they
are dated  (ibid., p. 410; italics inserted). This idea, however, does not at all capture3 There have always been some significant differences in their conceptions of incommensurability. See
Feyerabend (1977) and (1978), pp. 66–67; Hoyningen-Huene (2000a, 2001, forthcoming).
4 See Feyerabend (1995 [1960/1961]).
5 Feyerabend claimed that his notion of incommensurability pre-dated the 1962 introduction of the term
by about a decade. See Feyerabend (1988), pp. 228 ff. and (1993), p. 211. See also Feyerabend (1970b),
p. 219; Kuhn (1983), pp. 669, 684 n. 2; (2000), pp. 297–298. For discussions, see Hoyningen-Huene (1993),
p. 207; Preston (1997a), pp. 102–104, 216–217; Hoyningen-Huene (forthcoming).
6 See Hoyningen-Huene (1993), p. 206 and Sankey (1993).
7 According to Sankey, Kuhns notion of incommensurability underwent a major transformation to the
point that his later notion has little in common with his original account. See Sankey (1993, 1998).
Feyerabend can be interpreted as having anticipating Kuhns 1990s notion of taxonomic incommensu-
rability, with his 1965 claim that two theories are incommensurable if a new theory entails that all the
concepts of the preceding theory have zero extension or if it introduces rules . . . which change the system of
classes itself  (Feyerabend, 1965a, p. 268). See also Carrier (2001), p. 88.
8 For example, see Hoyningen-Huene (1993); Sankey (1993); Bird (2003).
9 Kuhn (1991), p. 4. For more on Kuhns account of his discovery of incommensurability, see Kuhn
(1977), pp. xi–xiii; (1981), pp. 3–6; (1989), pp. 49–50; (1991), p. 4; (1999), p. 33.
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ing either that Duhem had actually developed a notion of incommensurability, or
that Kuhn had borrowed the idea from Duhem.
Struan Jacobs has also recently rejected Agassis claim about Kuhns unpaid debt
to Duhem. However, Jacobs proceeds to accuse both Kuhn and Feyerabend of hav-
ing appropriated the idea of incommensurability from Michael Polanyi, without
having given Polanyi his due credit.10 By 1958, Polanyi had indeed developed a
notion of incommensurability that was similar to Kuhns in some significant re-
spects,11 and Jacobs presents some strong evidence in support of Kuhns unpaid debt
to Polanyi.12 However, Jacobss account of Polanyi as the source of Kuhns notion of
incommensurability is incomplete, as it does not temper Kuhns debt to Polanyi in
light of Kuhns debt to Ludwik Fleck.
In the foreword ofKuhn (1970a [1962]), Kuhn acknowledged Flecks work as antic-
ipating many of his ideas, and he candidly admitted that although readers will find few
references to Fleck, he is indebted to Fleck in more ways than [he] can now reconstruct
or evaluate (ibid., p. vii). Flecks concept of a thought-style clearly anticipates several
senses of Kuhns central notion of a paradigm,13 and Fleck had presented a phase-
model of scientific development covering pre-normal andnormal science.He even illus-
trated the idea with some of the same examples Kuhn later adopted.14
Kuhns debt to Fleck also directly concerns the notion of incommensurability.
Flecks book, Genesis and development of a scientific fact, discusses conceptual
change at length.15 It emphasizes that terms acquire their meanings from their the-
oretical context, and that those meanings change through theoretical transitions.16
Kuhn even used some of the same examples as Fleck did to explain meaning change
(such as the concepts of chemical elements and compounds).17 Moreover, they
both emphasized the theory-ladeness of observation, and they both drew explicitly
from Gestalt psychology, stressing that theory can determine the perception of
meaning. They both even acknowledged Wolfgang Köhler in this regard.1810 See Jacobs (2002), p. 106 and (2003), pp. 58, 69, 70.
11 For a comparison, see Jacobs (2002, 2003).
12 Polanyi had also used the term incommensurable in 1951 and 1958, but in contexts clearly different
from those of Kuhn and Feyerabend. See Polanyi (1958), p. 174 and (1951), p. 100. For a discussion of
these and other uses of the term outside the context of philosophy of science, see Jacobs (2002), p. 111 and
(2003), pp. 59–60.
13 There are also many significant differences between Flecks thought-styles and Kuhns paradigms. For
a discussion, see Babich (2003).
14 See Fleck (1979 [1935]), pp. 83 ff.
15 See ibid., pp. 9, 10, 19, 20–21, 25–28, 53, 36, 38–41, 53–54, 62, 64, 92–95, 98, 110, 122–123, 128.
16 See ibid., pp. 25, 39, 40, and especially pp. 53–54.
17 See ibid., pp. 122–123, 128 and compare Kuhn (1970a [1962]), pp. 130–134.
18 See Fleck (1979 [1935]), pp. 16, 44, 90–93, 120, 133, 142; (1986b [1935]), pp. 76–78; (1986c [1936]), pp.
84–85, and compare Kuhn (1970a [1962]), e.g. p. 204. Kuhn acknowledged his debt specifically to Gestalt
psychology (ibid., p. vi), and to Köhler (1979, p. ix). For an excellent discussion of Kuhns use, and
subsequent retraction, of the Gestalt metaphor to characterize theoretical advance, see Hoyningen-Huene
(1993), pp. 38–41, 204–205. For an introduction into Gestalt psychology including some aspects of its
philosophical significance, see Köhler (1947).
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differences between medical thinking, which attempts to understand irregular, tem-
porally dynamic phenomena such as an illness, and scientific thinking, which at-
tempts to understand uniform phenomena such as atomism in chemistry and
energetics in physics (Fleck, 1986a [1927], pp. 44–45). And in 1935, Fleck had used
the term incommensurable to describe conceptual replacements in theoretical tran-
sitions in science: The old concept of disease thus becomes quite incommensurable
with the new concepts and is not replaced by a completely adequate substitute
(Fleck, 1979 [1935], p. 62).19
Kuhn, who was instrumental in having Fleck (1935) translated and then pub-
lished in English, emphasized that his revelation (his discovery of incommensu-
rability) had occurred several years before he had read Fleck (in 1949 or 1950)
(Kuhn, 1979, p. vii). In fact, it was this revelation that had led him to Fleck
in the first place (ibid). Kuhn also explicitly emphasized that, at that time, he
was much engaged in exploring Köhler, Koffka, and other gestalt psychologists
(ibid., p. ix). As we shall see, Gestalt psychologys stress on the theory-ladeness of
observation, and on our ability to perceive certain meanings only after we are in
the possession of a particular theory is the main similarity in Kuhn and Feyera-
bends developments of their notions of incommensurability.
Thus, Fleck had developed a notion of incommensurability that anticipates
Kuhns, and Kuhn explicitly acknowledged his debt to Fleck. While this does
not exclude Jacobss claims about Kuhns unpaid debt to Polanyi, Fleck was
arguably the main influence on Kuhns development of his notion of
incommensurability.
As we have seen, Jacobs claims that Polanyi was also the source of Feyerabends
notion of incommensurability, and he claims that there is no express textual evi-
dence suggesting that Duhem contributed to Feyerabends understanding of incom-
mensurability (Jacobs, 2003, p. 60). As we shall see, both of these claims are
incorrect.3. Incommensurability and logical empiricism: Feyerabends attack on the conceptual
conservativism implicit in formal accounts of reduction and explanation (1962)
Feyerabends use and development of the notion of incommensurability has re-
ceived less attention than has Kuhns. John Preston has suggested that Feyerabend
developed his theory of meaning, and subsequently his notion of incommensurabil-
ity, based on his misreading of Wittgenstein (Preston, 1997a, pp. 23 ff.). However, as
we shall see, this too is incorrect.
In his landmark 1962 paper Explanation, reduction and empiricism, Feyerabend
initially introduced the term incommensurable as part of a criticism of the
conceptual conservativism that he found in Nagels theory of reduction and the19 This sentence and the term inkommensurabel appear in Fleck (1979 [1935]) on p. 82.
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reduction and explanation are impossible for general theories for two reasons.
The first reason that formal accounts fail is because some pairs of successive sci-
entific theories that are supposed to be formally reducible are actually logically
inconsistent. (This is not a case of incommensurability, which is the second qualita-
tive reason for the failure of formal accounts.)21 Feyerabend illustrated the point by
challenging one of Nagels favourite examples of a purported formal reduction: the
reduction of Galilean to Newtonian physics. A basic assumption of Galilean physics
is that the acceleration of a free-falling body is constant over any finite interval.
According to Newtonian physics, the acceleration of a free-falling body is never con-
stant. It always increases during its fall, due to the fact that the body approaches the
centre of attraction. If the height of the fall is negligible compared to the radius of
the earth, then the effect will also be negligible. However, if the height is significant
as compared to the radius of the earth, then this effect will be considerable, and Gali-
leos theory will produce false results. Galilean physics can indeed be logically
derived from Newtons theory, but only by introducing a false assumption (that
the height of the fall divided by the radius of the earth is zero). According to Feyera-
bend, [i]t is therefore impossible, for quantitative reasons, to establish a deductive
relationship between these two theories (1962, p. 47; italics in original).
Let us briefly focus on this argument and its historical origins. This is instructive
for two reasons. First, it will help to clarify a misunderstanding: in his analysis of
incommensurability, Preston conflates Feyerabends first quantitative reason for
the failure of formal accounts (logical inconsistency) with his second qualitative rea-
son (incommensurability), and subsequently unjustly criticizes Feyerabend for being
inconsistent about inconsistency and incommensurability (Preston, 1997a, pp. 105–
106). The mistaken view that between the 1960s and the 1970s Feyerabend changed
his notion of incommensurability from implying logical contradiction to denying the
possibility of logical contradiction is the result of conflating Feyerabends two dis-
tinct reasons for the failure of formal accounts (quantitative and qualitative). Sec-
ond, the historical origins of this argument illuminate the historical origins of its
compliment, the second qualitative reason for the failure of formal accounts (i.e.
incommensurability).
The point that some pairs of successive scientific theories are logically inconsistent
had been made by Popper (1957). Moreover, Popper had used exactly the same
example as Feyerabend to make the point that, logic, whether inductive or deduc-
tive, cannot possibly make the step from [Galileos theory] to Newtons (197220 I will work from the original 1962 version. It differs significantly from the 1981 reprint. For example,
Feyerabend removed many acknowledgements to Popper, and he removed a lengthy passage in which he
had explicitly emphasized his support for a normative approach to the philosophy of science over the
descriptive approach of the historical school.
21 Feyerabend clearly distinguished quantitative reasons for the failure of formal accounts (logical
inconsistency), discussed in Sections 3 and 4, from the qualitative reason for the failure of formal
accounts (i.e. incommensurability), discussed in Sections 5 through 7. (Sections 1 and 2 introduce formal
accounts, and the last Section 8, is the conclusion).
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ing that Keplers third law contradicts Newtons theory in precisely the same way as
Galileos (1972 [1957], p. 200). In order to establish deductive relations between
Keplers third law (the planets orbits are perfect ovals) and Newtons theory, one
has to make either one of two false assumptions: either that the mass of the sun is
equal to the mass of the planet, or that the mass of the planet is zero. Otherwise,
the two theories make quantitatively different claims about the orbits of planets
around the sun.22 Feyerabend acknowledged Popper as the source of this argument,
and as the source of these examples as the starting point of his investigations in the
original 1962 version of his paper.23
Popper had acknowledged Duhem as the source of this point and the example of
the relation between Keplers laws and Newtons theory (1972 [1957], p. 200 n. 10).24
However, the point and the example are even older than that. They had been used
against Hegels claim that [t]he Newtonian formula may be derived from the Keple-
rian law ([1989 [1827], p. 250, Part C, § 269) by Whewell in 1860.25 Feyerabend
(1962), following Popper (1957), following Duhem (1906), had repeated Whewells
point. Thus, Feyerabends innovation concerning the first reason for the failure of
formal accounts was merely to apply Whewells point to Nagel instead of to Hegel.
In his 1962 paper, Feyerabend distinguished such quantitative disagreements
between some pairs of successive scientific theories from the second reason for the
failure of formal accounts, as illustrated with other pairs of successive scientific the-
ories, which he called qualitative disagreements (discussed in Sections 5–7 of Fey-
erabend, 1962). The second qualitative reason for the failure of formal accounts is
the existence of incommensurable concepts.
Feyerabend used the notion of incommensurability to characterize the relation
between two successive fundamental scientific theories. By fundamental scientific22 In 1954, Feyerabend had used exactly this example to make the same point (1954, pp. 470–471), but
apparently he was drawing on Poppers lectures.
23 Matteo Collodel has brought to my attention that Watkinss memories tend to confirm that
Feyerabend had this Duhemian argument from Popper. Watkins claims that Feyerabend told him that
Poppers Duhemian argument had impressed him strongly when he first heard it in Alpbach in 1948
(Watkins, 2000, p. 49). When Popper reprinted his (1957) in his (1972), he added a Bibliographic note,
emphasising three things: first, that this was his, not Feyerabends point; second, that he had been making
this argument since the 1940s; and third, that these facts had apparently been overlooked by various
authors (Popper, 1972, p. 205). Popper clearly felt that he was not receiving his due credit because his idea
had been hijacked by Feyerabend. Feyerabends response to this bibliographic note was to add a footnote
(dated 1980) to the reprint of his (1962) in the first volume of his collected papers (1981). In it, Feyerabend
chastised Popper for claiming, in the bibliographic note, the point as his own, given that it was Duhems
(apparently not realizing, as we shall see, that it is even older), and he re-emphasized that this point was
only the starting point of his investigation. Feyerabend also emphasized that his contribution to the
subject was the second qualitative reason for the failure of formal accounts (i.e. incommensurability). See
Feyerabend (1981), p. 47 n. 6, p. 91 n. 95, and (1962), p. 92 n. 112. Many of the copious acknowledgements
to Popper from the original (1962) no longer appear in the 1981 reprint.
24 See Duhem (1954 [1906]), pp. 190–195.
25 See Whewell (1860), Appendix H. To my knowledge, it is unclear whether Duhem, Popper, or
Feyerabend were aware of Whewells argument.
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have implications about the very nature of reality. By calling two such theories incom-
mensurable, Feyerabend meant that they were conceptually incompatible: the main
concepts of one could neither be defined on the basis of the primitive descriptive terms
of the other, nor related to them via a correct empirical statement (1962, pp. 74, 90). As
a consequence, it is impossible to reduce incommensurable theories formally.
In 1962, Feyerabend illustrated incommensurability with a comparison of six
pairs of central concepts drawn from three episodes of fundamental theory change
in the course of scientific advance: (1) the dynamical characterization of impetus in
impetus theory of motion and the concept of force in the conceptual apparatus of
Newtonian mechanics, (2 & 3) the concepts of temperature and entropy in the tran-
sition from phenomenological thermodynamics to kinetic theory, and (4, 5, & 6) the
concepts mass, length and time in the transition from Newtonian to relativistic
mechanics.26
Feyerabend also claimed that incommensurability occurs in discussions of some
age-old philosophical problems; specifically, the mind–body problem, the problem
of the existence of the external world, and the problem of otherminds (pp. 31, 90). Fey-
erabend argued that such age-old philosophical problems have not been solved because
the disputants resist the kind of meaning change necessary for their dissolution.
All of these sets of concepts are incommensurable because they belong to mutu-
ally exclusive theoretical perspectives. These perspectives are mutually exclusive
because they give incompatible accounts of the nature of reality. Because the mean-
ings of their terms are provided by the theories to which they belong,27 when there is
theoretical change, there are meaning changes (Feyerabend, 1962, pp. 68, 94). These
changes in meaning not only affect our theoretical and observational terms. They
even affect our ontology (i.e. our conception of the nature of reality). When this
occurs, there is incommensurability; or as Feyerabend later put it, a theory is incom-
mensurable with another if its ontological consequences are incompatible with the
ontological consequences of the latter (Feyerabend, 1981, p. xi).
Thus, Feyerabends notion of incommensurability is intended to capture the idea
of conceptual incompatibility due to changes of meaning that occur in theoretical
transitions that affect our ontological beliefs. Two fundamental theories are incom-
mensurable because the meanings of their terms are determined by the theoretical
principles that govern their correct use, and these principles are qualitatively incom-
patible (1962, p. 58).
Let us consider the function of Feyerabends notion of incommensurability in
Feyerabend (1962). Feyerabend used the notion to attempt to expose a dogmatic ele-
ment that contemporary empiricists share with school philosophies such as Plato-
nism and Cartesianism (from whom they had tried to distance themselves by26 In subsequent publications, Feyerabend added the example of geometrical optics and wave optics, see
Feyerabend (1965b), p. 227 n. 19.
27 Feyerabend can, and did, simply assume this semantic principle as part of his immanent criticism of
Nagels views, as the target of his critique (Nagels Chapter 11) also accepts it. See Nagel (1966 [1961]),
pp. 352, 357.
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element is due to the assumption that the meanings of empirical terms remain stable
through theoretical transitions; or what Feyerabend called the principle of meaning
invariance (ibid., p. 30). Feyerabend argued that this principle is inconsistent with
the existence of incommensurable concepts.
Feyerabend drew two main consequences from the insight that some pairs of suc-
cessive scientific theories are incommensurable. First, successive scientific theories
that are incommensurable have no logical relations:28 Fo
29 See
30 Fey
(forthc
31 Un
later n
Agains
transla
It willThe order introduced into our experiences by Newtons theory is retained and
improved by relativity. This means that the concepts of relativity theory are
sufficiently rich to allow us to state all the facts which were stated before with
the help of Newtonian physics. Yet these two sets of categories are completely
different and bear no logical relation to each other. (Ibid., pp. 88–89)Under the assumption that formal logical relations can only hold between theories if
their shared terms share meanings, as they have different meanings, they cannot be
brought directly into formal relations.29 This is the basis of Feyerabends argument
against formal accounts of reduction and explanation. Second, a revision in the log-
ical empiricist conception of scientific advance is required. Older theories, and the
concepts used to state them, are not corrected and absorbed, and thereby legitimised.
Rather, they are rejected and replaced, having been falsified. In this way, the logical
empiricists conceptually conservative (or retentive) accounts of reduction and expla-
nation are undermined by the existence of the development of incommensurable con-
cepts in the course of scientific advance.
In 1965, Feyerabend further attempted to clarify his notion of incommensurabil-
ity by claiming that two theories are incommensurable when the meanings of their
main descriptive terms depend on mutually inconsistent principles.30 Still later, he
claimed that [w]hen using the term ‘‘incommensurability’’ [he] always meant deduc-
tive disjointedness, and nothing else (Feyerabend, 1977, p. 365).
In the mid-1970s, Feyerabend developed a different conception of incommensura-
bility, which he applied to the transition from the Greek archaic, aggregate worldview
ofHomer to the substance worldview ofAristotle. Neto (1991) claims that Feyerabend
was lead to incommensurability through his study of Greek philosophy and its rela-
tionship toWesternRationalism.This puts the cart before the horse.While this affected
Feyerabends development of the notion of incommensurability in the 1970s, originally
incommensurability was not a consequence of such a comparison.31r a discussion, see Hoyningen-Huene (2000b).
similarly Feyerabend (1958b), p. 83 and (1961c), p. 388.
erabend (1965b), p. 227. See also (1975), pp. 269–270, 276. For a discussion, see Hoyningen-Huene
oming), p. 106.
fortunately, space limitations prohibit an analysis of the differences between Feyerabends early and
otions of incommensurability. Any such analysis should consult Feyerabends companion to
t method: the unpublished German monograph, An introduction to the philosophy of nature (my
tion). It was written from the perspective of epistemological anarchism in 1971, and revised in 1976.
soon appear as Feyerabend (forthcoming).
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before 1962 was heavily influenced by a number of individuals who were discussing
a wide range of different topics.32 But before proceeding to investigate the historical
development of his notion of incommensurability, let us consider how the term
incommensurable entered Feyerabends philosophy of science in 1962. This is
instructive because it highlights a major influence on Feyerabends development of
the notion of incommensurability: Gestalt psychology.
As we have seen, Fleck and Polanyi had used the term incommensurable
prior to 1962, and they very likely influenced Kuhn. However, there is no evi-
dence that Feyerabend had read either Fleck or Polanyi before 1962. There is,
however, another source of the notion of incommensurability that is common
to both Kuhn and Feyerabend. In 1920, Köhler had written a book on the rela-
tionship between the mental concepts of psychology and the material concepts
of physics (Köhler, 1920). A condensed version appeared in English in 1938. In
the opening sentences, Köhler wrote:32 Fey
(1995)
33 See
origina
result
34 See
percep
214e a
35 SeeIn order to orient itself in the company of natural sciences, psychology must
discover connections wherever it can between its own phenomena and those
of other disciplines. If this search fails, then psychology must recognize that
its categories and those of natural science are incommensurable.33Köhler proceeded to suggest that while Gestalten are common in psychology, their
existence in physics would violate the fundamentals of exact science, and he empha-
sized that the thought and language of physics were established in accordance with
other points of view than [psychology, specifically psychological Gestalten] (ibid.).
Köhlers strategy for attempting to overcome this problem with the relation of psy-
chological wholes to the reductionist concepts of physics was to attempt to find such
organic units in physics. This is the central topic of his essay. But what connections
are there between Köhlers ideas and Feyerabends 1962 notion of incommensu-
rability?
First of all, one of the central topics of Feyerabends early philosophical work was
Wittgensteins Investigations. This book discusses Gestalt figures at some length (see
Wittgenstein, 1958, XI, 193eff.). In fact, Wittgensteins later philosophy was heavily
influenced by Gestalt psychology, especially by Köhler,34 who is one of the very few
named sources in the entire book.35erabend explicitly discussed his development of the notion of incommensurability in Feyerabend
, p. 92; (1978), pp. 67, 114–115; (1970b); (1987), p. 156; (1993), pp. 210 ff.
Köhler (1938 [1920]), p. 17; italics inserted. The term inkommensurabel does not appear in the
l 1920 German version. Thus, Feyerabends use of the term incommensurable appears to be the
of W. Elliss translation.
Wittgenstein on the difference between seeing and seeing as, as well as the general problems with
tual psychology that led to the development of Gestalt psychology: Wittgenstein (1958), XI, 193e–
nd Köhler (1947), pp. 81–122.
Wittgenstein (1958), XI, 203e.
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notion of scientific revolutions and the incommensurability involved.36 In his 1961
comments on a draft of (Kuhn, 1970a [1962]), Feyerabend had even recommended
that Kuhn must read Wittgenstein on the distinction between seeing and seeing
as, that is, exactly those passages of Wittgensteins views on perceptions in which
Wittgenstein cites Köhler (Feyerabend, 1995 [1960/1961], p. 384). This, by itself, is
a possible indication that Feyerabend may have had the term incommensurable
from Köhler.
Third, Köhler was not only a founding father of Gestalt psychology, he was also
active in philosophy, especially the philosophy of mind.37 Like Feyerabend, he was
very interested in the consequences that the psychology of perception have for philo-
sophical accounts of science,38 as well as the relationship between folk psychological
concepts and physical concepts. This is the topic of Feyerabend (1963b,c), where
Feyerabend argued against the need to reduce the former to the latter in favor of
eliminative materialism. According to Feyerabend, the meanings of the mental psy-
chological terms should be eliminated, and replaced by materialist physical con-
cepts. In arguing this point, Feyerabend went so far as to claim that every
interesting discussion, that is every discussion which leads to an advance of knowl-
edge, terminates in a situation in which some decisive change of meaning has oc-
curred (Feyerabend, 1963b, p. 58). Moreover, Feyerabend used the example of
the mind–body problem to illustrate his notion of incommensurable concepts in Fey-
erabend (1962), where he first used the term incommensurable. Thus, Köhler had
applied the term incommensurable to an example quite similar to one Feyerabend
used to illustrate incommensurability in 1962, and many times thereafter. He applied
it to the difficulties in relating the holistic mental concepts of psychology and the
reductionist material concepts of physics.
Fourth, as we have seen, Feyerabend first used the term incommensurable to
attack Nagels views on the formal conditions of reduction. They appear in Chap-
ter 11, The reduction of theories, of Nagel (1966 [1961]). In the same chapter,
Nagel also considered the issue of individual wholes or organic unities (such
units are supposedly more than just aggregates of independent parts or members),
noting that it has been claimed that such wholes exist in physics, biology, and
psychology, as well as the social sciences).39 In fact, Nagels discussion of the
issue takes up some seventeen pages of the chapter.40 Who did Nagel cite on this36 See e.g. Kuhn (1970a [1962]), p. 204.
37 There is even a contribution by Köhler in the first book of which Feyerabend was an editor. See
Feyerabend & Maxwell (1966).
38 By the mid-1960s at the very latest, Feyerabend was clearly aware of the basic principles of Gestalt
psychology (see e.g. Feyerabend, 1965b, p. 220 n. 8 where he sets them out). But as early as his 1951
doctoral thesis, he was citing works on the psychology of perception, and his close scrutiny of
Wittgensteins Investigations in 1952, all suggest that Feyerabend was familiar with, and excited by, the
implications that Gestalt psychology could have for philosophical accounts of the nature of scientific
knowledge and its advance.
39 See Nagel (1966 [1961]), pp. 380 ff.
40 See ibid., pp. 380–397.
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(1938 [1920]),41 exactly where Köhler used the term incommensurable to describe
the relationship between some concepts in psychology and in physics—an exam-
ple very similar to one of Feyerabends oft repeated examples of incommensura-
bility. It seems very unlikely that this is a mere coincidence. It seems more likely
that when Feyerabend was preparing his criticism of Nagels account of reduc-
tion, he had a look at the main sources Nagel cited on the difficulties with reduc-
tion, and there he found the term incommensurable. Alternatively, Feyerabend
(1962) may have adopted the term incommensurable from Nagel himself, who
had already used the phrase incommesurably different in the context of discuss-
ing reduction (Nagel, 1960 [1949], p. 309).
It is likely that the term incommensurable found its way into Feyerabends phi-
losophy of science via the influence of holistic ideas in Gestalt psychology and the
potential problems they could cause for formal accounts of reduction. In this sense,
the term appears in a 1938 publication by Wolfgang Köhler, and later in Nagels
(1960 [1949]) discussion of the same topic, and there are some very strong reasons
that suggest that Feyerabend had it from these sources.4. Incommensurability as thesis I: theory change causes meaning change (1958)
Feyerabend sometimes traced the origins of his notion of incommensurability
back to his thesis I in An attempt at a realistic interpretation of experience (Feyera-
bend, 1958a).42 In that paper, Feyerabend criticized two conceptions of meaning. He
argued against the logical positivist idea that the meaning of an observational term is
determined by immediate experiences, as well as against the idea (often attributed to
Wittgenstein) that meaning is determined by use. Instead, Feyerabend argued for the
idea that meaning of a term, even an observational term, is determined by its theo-
retical context. More precisely, the meanings of observational terms are determined
by the theoretical principles that govern their correct use according to our best the-
ories. Such a contextual theory of meaning clearly differs from the idea (often attrib-
uted to Wittgenstein) that a terms meaning is, or is determined by, its use. The
difference is that whereas the latter allows that common usage contributes to the
meaning of a term, the former insists that common usage does not. Feyerabend even
goes further in suggesting that common usage should be replaced by correct usage as
determined by our best theories. This can easily be seen in Feyerabends discussion of
the meaning of the term temperature, where he argues that the meaning of the term
is not determined by the laymans normal use, but instead by the principles of statis-
tical thermodynamics.43
After criticising phenomenal and use theories of meanings, Feyerabend then
developed Thesis I: the interpretation of an observation language is determined by41 See ibid., pp. 392 nn. 22, 24 and p. 393 n. 26.
42 See Feyerabend (1978), pp. 67–78 and (1977), pp. 363 ff.
43 See e.g. Feyerabend (1962), pp. 76–79. See similarly Feyerabend (1958a, 1965a).
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theories change (Feyerabend, 1958a, p. 163). Thesis I is based on a contextual theory
of meaning according to which the meaning of a term is determined by the theories
whose truth is presupposed when it is used to describe some feature of the world. In
his (1958a), Feyerabend argued that when older theories are replaced, the meanings
of the observational terms used to test the theories change. Just as in Feyerabend
(1962), the result is incommensurability: the idea that successive scientific theories
are conceptually incompatible. Thus, thesis I is unmistakably an early version of
the incommensurability thesis.
With the notion of incommensurability, in his (1958a), Feyerabend challenged an
implicit conceptual conservativism in logical positivism: The assumptions that theo-
retical terms derive their meaning solely through their connection with experience,44
and that experience itself is a stable (or unchanging) foundation on which theoretical
meaning can be based. Instead of such a bottom-up version of the relation of expe-
rience and theoretical knowledge, according to which experience determines the
meanings of our theories, Feyerabend argued for a top-down version, according
to which our theories determine the meaning we attach to our experiences. Accord-
ing to Feyerabend, experience cannot be taken for granted. It takes on its particular
character in light of the theories we bring to it.
Clearly, then, Feyerabend had developed a notion of incommensurability by
1958, (before he had met Kuhn in Berkeley in 1960). However, the notion of incom-
mensurability can be found in Feyerabends work even earlier than that, and this
should come as no surprise as Feyerabend (1958) is a condensed version of Feyera-
bends unpublished doctoral thesis (1951).5. Incommensurability and quantum mechanics: Feyerabend’s attack on the conceptual
conservativism implicit in Bohrs principle of complementarity (1958)
In his autobiography, Feyerabend acknowledged Niels Bohrs influence on the
development of his notion of incommensurability in the 1950s. Feyerabend recalled
a conversation in which Bohr had talked about the discovery that the square root of
two cannot be an integer or a fraction. According to Feyerabend, Bohr presented the
event as having led to the extension of a concept of number that retained some prop-
erties of integers and fractions, but changed others; and claimed that the transition
from classical to quantum mechanics was carried out in accordance with precisely44 According to logical empiricists, the meaning of a term is grounded on experience, either directly in the
case of observation terms, or indirectly in the case of theoretical terms. For example, the meaning of red is
determined by observations of the color red, while the meaning of a theoretical term such as mass is
determined by its connection to other terms such as weight, whose meaning is determined directly by
observations. Feyerabend repeatedly challenged the epistemological and semantic significance of the
distinction between observational and theoretical terms. See e.g. Feyerabend (1954), p. 470; (1958a), pp.
164–165; (1958b); (1960a,c); (1961a), p. 82; (1961b), p. 443; (1962), pp. 160–163; (1965b), pp. 198, 219–224;
(1969a).
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mensurability to try to capture the idea of conceptual changes that retain some prop-
erties of a concept, while changing others, these autobiographical recollections are
evidence of Bohrs direct influence on Feyerabends development of the notion of
incommensurable concepts in the 1950s.
More importantly, Feyerabend used the notion of incommensurability in a pub-
lication on Bohrs complementarity thesis prior to 1962. In Feyerabend (1958b), Fey-
erabend argued that Bohrs complementarity thesis is an example of an unjustified
conceptual conservativism in the sciences, taking issue with Bohrs contention that
the account of all quantum mechanical evidence will always necessarily be expressed
in classical terms.45 He presented Bohrs defence of the principle of complementarity
as based on the correspondence principle: the conviction that every experience must
necessarily make its appearance within the frame of our customary points of view,
which is currently that of classical physics. However, according to Feyerabend, just
because classical concepts have been successful in the past, and because at the mo-
ment it may be difficult, or even impossible, for us to imagine how to replace them,
it does not follow that the classical framework could not one day be superseded.
Consequently, it does not follow that all our future microscopic theories will have
to use the notion of complementarity as a fundamental notion.
Instead, according to Feyerabend, a theory may be found whose conceptual appa-
ratus, when applied to the domain of validity of classical physics, would be just as
comprehensive and useful as the classical apparatus, without coinciding with it.
He claimed that such a situation is by no means uncommon, and he used the tran-
sition from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics to bolster his point. According to Fey-
erabend, while the concepts of relativity theory are sufficiently rich to state all of the
facts captured by Newtonian physics, the two sets of categories are completely dif-
ferent and bear no logical relations to each other.46 This is clearly a version of the
incommensurability thesis. On Feyerabends fallibilist view of empirical knowledge,
no element of our knowledge can be held to be necessary or absolutely certain. In our
search for satisfactory explanations, we are at liberty to change any parts of our
existing knowledge, however fundamental they may seem, including the concepts
of classical physics (Feyerabend, 1961c, pp. 323–324, 326). Thus, Feyerabends
1958 argument against Bohrs contention of the necessity of maintaining classical
concepts for the description of quantum phenomena was based on the idea that
new incommensurable concepts could be invented, and one day could even be used
to replace classical descriptions.4745 Feyerabend presented a synopsis of his argument in (1962), p. 43.
46 See Feyerabend (1958b), p. 83, (1961c), p. 388, and compare (1962), pp. 88–89.
47 Feyerabend made this argument repeatedly. See Feyerabend (1958b), pp. 81–83; (1958c), pp. 50, 59 n.
6; (1960b), pp. 321 ff.; (1961c), pp. 384 ff.; (1995 [1960/1961]), pp. 378 ff.; (1962), p. 88 n. 106; (1963a,
1965b, 1970c). But around 1970, Feyerabend abandoned it (see 1970a), and completely inverted his
estimation of Bohr. See and compare Feyerabend (1961c), pp. 384 ff. with (1970a) and (1993), pp. 15 n. 1,
31–32.
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the term itself, was first published in this 1958 paper on Bohrs thesis of complemen-
tarity.48 As we have seen, one of several chief influences on Feyerabends develop-
ment of the notion of incommensurability in the 1950s was unquestionably Niels
Bohr. Even so, Prestons claim is incorrect. Feyerabend had already published the
idea in German in 1954.6. Incommensurability and ontology: Feyerabend’s attack on the conceptual
conservativism implicit in attempts to separate philosophical accounts of ontology
from physics (1954)
The first use of the notion of incommensurability in Feyerabends published work
appeared in the paper Physik und Ontologie (1954), which discusses the nature of
major theoretical advances in physics, and their semantic and ontological implica-
tions. Feyerabend argued that major theoretical advances in physics are not part
of a continuous process of enriching already established ideas, and that scientific
progress is not a process in which existing ideas are improved or the number of
known facts is simply increased. Instead, Feyerabend argued that new theories force
a revision in the ontological status of older ideas. After major theoretical transitions,
older ideas can no longer be accepted as purported true descriptions of reality. This
is because they are conceptually incompatible with better ideas that are supposed to
describe reality. According to Feyerabend (1954), conceptual replacements that
occur in theoretical advance can have ontological implications: when new fundamen-
tal theories replace older ideas, a correspondingly new conception of reality is
formed. In the course of theoretical advance in physics, what we take to be real itself
is not simply improved or enriched: It is completely reordered (ibid., p. 470; my
translation).
Feyerabend argued for this view of scientific advance on the basis of the claim
that the meanings of scientific terms are determined by the theories in which they
occur. Consequently, given theory change, there is meaning change (ibid., p. 467).
This is the first instance of the notion of incommensurability in Feyerabends pub-
lished work. According to Feyerabend, ontology and semantics are thus normative,
not descriptive: they vary historically in accordance with theoretical advance, and
when new theories replace older ones, both our conception of reality and the mean-
ings of our terms describing it change.
Feyerabend used the notion of incommensurability to criticize an implicit concep-
tual conservativism in attempts to separate philosophical accounts of ontology from
physics. Purely analytic attempts to explicate what we take to be real presuppose a
fixed conception of reality. However, if our conception of the nature of reality is con-
tingent upon our developing theoretical ideas, then ontology cannot be studied inde-
pendently of the empirical sciences.48 Preston (1997a), pp. 102–103, cites Feyerabend (1958b, 1961c).
378 E. Oberheim / Stud. Hist. Phil. Sci. 36 (2005) 363–3907. Incommensurability and methodology: Feyerabends attack on the conceptual
conservativism implicit in Heisenbergs principle that established results set
conditions on further research (1951)
In his unpublished doctoral thesis, Feyerabend discussed the relationship between
the general theory of relativity and Newtons theory (Feyerabend, 1951, pp. 87 ff.).
He claimed that Newtons theory was replaced by the general theory of relativity,
and emphasized that the latter talks about completely different relationships (ibid.,
p. 90). Feyerabend based this claim on the idea that the meanings of the concepts
of general relativity and Newtons theory are determined by the theories to which
they belong, emphasizing that when the former replaced the latter, there was mean-
ing change (ibid., p. 89). Feyerabend also claimed that these two conceptually incom-
patible theories may even predict the same experimental results within their shared
domains. However, as the theories used to interpret the sentences expressing the
experimental result are conceptually incompatible, there will be two incommensura-
ble interpretations of it. Feyerabend made exactly these points concerning the tran-
sition from Aristotelian dynamics to Newtons theory in the course of illustrating
incommensurability in 1962 (Feyerabend, 1962, p. 57). Thus, Feyerabend had clearly
employed the idea of incommensurability as early as 1951.
Moreover, in his doctoral thesis, Feyerabend used this basic idea of incommensu-
rability in much the same way in which he used it in his (1954, 1958a,b, 1962). He
used it to attack what he considered to be an unjustified conceptual conservatism.
In this instance, he attacked the conceptual conservativism implicit in the methodo-
logical principle that established results must be presupposed by all further research,
as set out by Heisenberg (Feyerabend, 1951, p. 190). Feyerabends reaction to Hei-
senbergs conceptual conservativism was to argue that imposing conditions on fur-
ther research on the basis of established results could hinder progress. It overlooks
that new concepts with different meanings could replace those older ideas. This reac-
tion mirrors exactly his reaction to the conceptual conservativism he found in
attempts to separate philosophical and scientific accounts of ontology, Bohrs com-
plementarity thesis, logical positivist theories of meaning, and formal theories of
reduction and explanation. It was also based on exactly the same idea: the possibility
of developing new theories whose concepts are conceptually incompatible with those
of existing theories (i.e. incommensurability).
It follows that Jacobss assertions concerning Feyerabends unpaid debt to Pola-
nyi as the source of his notion of incommensurability cannot be correct.49 Polanyis49 See Jacobs (2002), p. 106 and (2003), pp. 58, 69, 70. Neither Jacobs (2002, 2003) nor Preston (1997b)
provide any instance of Feyerabend having mentioned Polanyi before the mid-1970s. They base their
claims about the connection between Feyerabend and Polanyi on Feyerabends 1991 remark that
somewhere along the way I read an interesting paper by Michael Polanyi (Feyerabend, 1991, pp. 492, 501;
italics inserted). It is, however, clear that Feyerabend and Polanyi were acquainted at the latest by 1957.
They both participated in the Ninth Symposium of the Colston Research Society held in Bristol in April of
1957, where they discussed each others contributions. Feyerabend typed up these discussions for
publication. There is even a photo of the participants in which Feyerabend is standing directly behind
Polanyi. See the title page of Körner (1957).
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(1958).50 Feyerabend had developed his notion of incommensurability by 1951,
and he had already used it in publications that had appeared in 1954 and 1958. Fey-
erabend did not draw on Polanyi concerning his notion of incommensurability, and
Polanyi had not presaged . . . Feyerabends motif of incommensurability (Jacobs,
2002, p. 106).51 Feyerabends notion of incommensurability actually pre-dates Pola-
nyis use of the idea as applied to scientific theories and, as we shall see, it comes from
a different source.
Moreover, while there are indeed some significant similarities between Polanyis
notion of incommensurability and Feyerabends post-1970 ideas,52 and more so be-
tween Polanyi and Kuhns ideas,53 there are also some striking differences between
Polanyis notion of incommensurability and Feyerabends pre-1970 ideas. For exam-
ple, according to Jacobs, Polanyi used his notion of incommensurability to argue
against the possibility of rationally comparing incommensurable conceptual systems
(ibid., pp. 114–115). Between 1951 and 1970, Feyerabend repeatedly insisted that the
existence of incommensurability does not preclude rational comparison.548. Incommensurability and perception: Feyerabend’s attack on the conceptual
conservativism implicit in the logical positivists foundational use of
protocol sentences (1949–1952)
Feyerabend discussed his notion of incommensurable concepts with the Kraft Cir-
cle from 1949–1951.55 The Kraft circle was a student group named after Viktor Kraft
(Feyerabends Ph.D. supervisor) and modelled after the Vienna Circle (of which
Kraft was a member). Guests such as Elizabeth Anscombe and Ludwig Wittgenstein
attended meetings.56
Meeting Wittgenstein and attempting to rewrite the Investigations as a treatise had
a profound and long-lasting influence on Feyerabends philosophical development.57
Feyerabend had even planned to study under Wittgenstein at Cambridge, and had
received a fellowship to do so. But Wittgenstein died, so Feyerabend went to London50 See and compare Jacobs (2002), p. 108 with pp. 111–116, and see Jacobs (2003), p. 61. Polanyi had
developed a notion of incommensurability between a scientific and a religious worldview in 1946, but in his
(1964 [1946]), he explicitly rejected the idea of incommensurability between scientific theories. See ibid.,
p. 66 and Jacobs (2003), pp. 61, 71 n. 5 for a discussion.
51 This does not rule out the possibility that Feyerabends 1975 notion of incommensurability my have
owed something to Polanyi.
52 See Preston (1997b).
53 See Jacobs (2003), p. 67 and (2002), p. 113.
54 See e.g. (1965c), pp. 227 ff.
55 See Feyerabend (1978), pp. 108 ff. and (1966), pp. 3 ff.
56 See Feyerabend (1978), pp. 115–116; (1993), pp. 259–260; (1995), p. 92.
57 See Feyerabend (1995), p. 94. Anscombe had given Feyerabend an unpublished manuscript of the
Philosophical investigations. Feyerabend attempted to rewrite it as an essay. See Feyerabend (1955). For
details, see Oberheim (forthcoming).
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Feyerabend did not develop the idea of incommensurability primarily out of Witt-
gensteins Investigations. This is clear, as in developing the notion of incommensura-
bility, Feyerabend, as we have seen, explicitly rejected the idea that the meaning of a
term is, or is determined by, its use, grounding the idea of incommensurability on a
contextual theory of meaning.58
Feyerabend sometimes traced the development of his notion of incommensurabil-
ity back to discussions he had with Anscombe sometime between 1949 and 1952
(Feyerabend, 1978, pp. 145 ff.).59 The discussions with Anscombe concerned the nat-
ure of perception and the foundational role of observation in positivist philosophy.
According to Feyerabends critique of logical positivism, every positivistic obser-
vation language is based upon a metaphysical (i.e. untestable) ontology (Feyerabend,
1958a, pp. 148–149). The problem lies in the tension between the positivistsmaxim of
testability and their foundational use of observation claims. On the one hand, knowl-
edge claims should be verifiable. They should be subject(able) to empirical tests. On
the other hand, empirical tests are supposedly made on the stable basis of intersubjec-
tively verifiable observations. These observations are crucial to positivism because
they provide the stable, empirical foundation for such tests. In other words, the rea-
son that knowledge claims have a special epistemic status (according to logical posi-
tivism) is that they have been (or can be) tested against experience. However, in order
for the observation sentences to play this foundational role for testing knowledge
claims, they themselves must be stable and intersubjectively verifiable. Consequently,
they cannot themselves be open to tests. Otherwise their foundational role would be
undermined. Hence, a metaphysical element has seeped into science by way of the
foundational role of observation sentences in testing knowledge claims.60
In this respect, logical positivism contains a dogmatic or conceptually conserva-
tive element: the foundational role of observation sentences in theory testing. Fey-
erabends critique of this conservative element was based on the idea that the
meanings of the terms of observation sentences are determined by the theories to
which they belong. He tried to extend and enforce the maxim of testability across
the whole system—not just to theoretical knowledge claims, but to the observation
sentences supporting them as well. Not only should the theoretical knowledge claims
be testable, but so should the observation sentences which serve as the basis for their
test. In this way, Feyerabend used the notion of incommensurability to attack the
foundational role of protocol sentences as an unjustifiable form of conceptual con-
servativism in logical positivism.58 Moreover, Feyerabend emphasized that he first read the Investigations in detail in London in 1952, that
is, after he had submitted his dissertation (Feyerabend, 1978, pp. 115–116). Elsewhere, Feyerabend also
claimed to have read a manuscript of the Investigations in 1950 (Feyerabend, 1987, p. 294).
59 Feyerabend also claimed that he tried to explain this early notion of incommensurability in Poppers
seminar (in 1952), and also to a small group of people at Anscombes home in London (in 1952). See
Feyerabend (1978), p. 67 nn. 114, 115; (1993), p. 260; (1995), p. 92.
60 For an excellent discussion of Feyerabends critique of foundationalism, see Couvalis (1989).
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tack several prominent forms of conceptual conservativism, such as Heisenbergs
methodological principle (1951), attempts to distinguish philosophical accounts of
ontology from physics (1954), the foundational role of the stability thesis in logical
positivism (1951, 1958a), Bohrs principle of complementarity (1958a, 1961c, 1962,
1965b, 1970c), and the logical empiricists models of explanation and reduction
(1962, 1963a). He also used the idea of incommensurability to attack forms of con-
ceptual conservativism implicit in the monistic test models promoted by classical
empiricists, the logical positivists, the logical empiricists, Popper, and Kuhn
(1958a, 1962, 1963a, 1965b, 1970c); Kantian transcendental necessities (1962,
1965b,c); traditional philosophical conundrums like the problem of the existence
of the external world, the problem of the existence of other minds, and especially
the mind–body problem (1962, 1965b, 1967, 1969b, 1970c); certain aspects of Witt-
gensteins later philosophy as well as the linguistic philosophical movement that
takes the utility of everyday concepts as given and merely attempts to analyse them,
without changing their meanings (or arguments from synonymy) (1962, 1963a,
1965b, 1969c, 1970c); Poppers conception of verisimilitude (1970b); and scientific
realist characterizations of scientific knowledge and scientific advance (1970b). How-
ever, a discussion of these post-1962 uses of the notion of incommensurability to at-
tack unjustified forms of conceptual conservativism is beyond the scope of this
essay.61
In the third English edition of Against method (but not in the two English editions
that preceded it), Feyerabend emphasized that his notion of incommensurability was
originally the result of considerations about the nature of perception that he had had
while studying the literature on the positivists notion of protocol statements (1993,
p. 211). He then proceeded to give the most detailed account of his early develop-
ment of his notion of incommensurability.61 FoFollowing this argument I introduced the assumption that the meaning of
observation statements depends on the nature of the objects described and, as this
nature depends on the most advanced theories, on the content of these theories. Or
as I formulated it in my first English paper on the topic [Feyerabend, 1958a]:
the interpretation of an observation language is determined by the theories which
we use to explain what we observe, and it changes as soon as these theories
change. (Ibid., p. 211; italics inserted)Thus, Feyerabend had discussed his notion of incommensurability with Elizabeth
Anscombe by 1950 at the latest, and he used it to attack a form of conceptual con-
servativism inherent in the logical positivists use of protocol statements in theory
testing in 1951. Feyerabend also emphasized that it was discussions of protocol sen-
tences, and not discussions of Wittgensteins notion of meaning, that influenced his
developing notion of incommensurable concepts (Feyerabend, 1981, pp. 49, 125).r details, see Oberheim (forthcoming).
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advance (1906)
According to Giedymin (1982), the origins of the idea of incommensurability in
the philosophy of science date back to LeRoy and Ajdukiewicz in Poincarés conven-
tionalist tradition.62 While something similar to the notion of incommensurability
can indeed be found in Ajdukiewiczs work, there is no direct evidence connecting
Ajdukiewicz to either Kuhn or Feyerabend.63
Moreover, the similarities between Ajdukiewiczs discussion of the untranslatabil-
ity of scientific theories is only superficially similar to Kuhn and Feyerabends no-
tions of incommensurability. Ajdukiewiczs concerns were with situations in which
two empirically equivalent theories were nonetheless untranslatable. Here, the prob-
lem is that while they differ semantically, they do not differ empirically. For Kuhn
and Feyerabend, incommensurable theories are not empirically equivalent, and
Kuhn only began to use a special notion of untranslatability to help explicate incom-
mensurability in 1969 (well after he initially introduced his notion of incommensura-
bility). Feyerabend explicitly rejected the idea that incommensurable theories are
untranslatable, insisting that one can very easily translate between two incommensu-
rable theories (Feyerabend, 1970d, p. 233). Ajdukiewiczs discussions about the
untranslatability of empirically equivalent theories appear primarily to concern the
problem of the underdetermination of theory by fact, whereas Kuhn and Feyera-
bends notion of incommensurability has much more to do with the theory-ladeness
of observation.
However, there was another direct influence on Feyerabends development of the
notion of incommensurability that has been overlooked: The influence of Pierre Du-
hem. In his Ph.D. thesis, Feyerabend cited several times from The aim and structure
of physical theory (Duhem, 1908 [1906]).64
Although Feyerabend cited Duhem on a different point from what he later called
thesis I, one of the locations in which Feyerabend cited Duhem is quite revealing.
Feyerabend cited Duhem directly in the middle of explaining his early conception
of incommensurability—one sentence before criticizing Heisenbergs conservativism,
and three sentences after writing, rather, the content of their statements is deter-
mined by the new law of gravitation. The concepts change their meaning correspond-
ing to this new theory (Feyerabend, 1951, p. 90; my translation). Thus, Feyerabend62 See Giedymin (1970), p. 257 n. 1 and (1982). See also Preston (1997a), p. 217 n. 4. The point has also
been made by Wisdom (1974), p. 299, who cites Skolimowski.
63 See Ajdukiewicz (1974), pp. 56–57, 67, 75–81, 86–87, (passages originally published 1934). Ajdukiewicz
is indirectly connected to Kuhn, as Fleck and Ajdukiewicz appear to have been acquainted. There is a
reprint of a paper by Ajdukiewicz in the University Library in Warsaw with a dedication by Ajdukiewicz
to Fleck dated 1935. See Cohen & Schnelle (1986), p. 16.
64 See especially Feyerabend (1951), pp. 135 n. 75 and 142 n. 177. I will cite from the 1954 English
translation, which contains all of the relevant passages to the 1908 German translation from which I will
draw.
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has Duhem got to do with incommensurability?
Duhem had claimed that what a physicist states as the result of an experiment
is not simply the recital of some observed facts. Rather, it is the interpretation of
these facts on the basis of the theories the scientist regards as true (1954 [1906], p.
159). It follows, according to Duhem, that in order to understand the meanings
that scientists ascribe to their own statements, it is necessary to understand the
theories that they use in order to interpret what they observe. In other words,
Duhem had stated what Feyerabend called thesis I, which, according to
Feyerabend himself, is an early version of his notion of incommensurability.
Moreover, exactly this passage is doubly underlined in Feyerabends
personal copy of The aim and structure of physical theory (Duhem, 1908 [1906],
p. 209).65
Preston has presented Feyerabends development of thesis I as based on a mis-
reading of Wittgensteins theory of meaning (Preston, 1997a, pp. 23 ff.). This is
incorrect. Feyerabend developed thesis I from a correct reading of Duhem. As
thesis I is an early version of the incommensurability thesis, it follows that Fey-
erabend developed the notion of incommensurability from ideas he found in (Du-
hem, 1908 [1906]). That Duhem was indeed the uncited source of the second
qualitative reason for the failure of formal accounts (i.e. incommensurability) in
Feyerabend (1962) is further substantiated given that Duhem, as we have seen,
was belatedly admittedly the source of Feyerabends first quantitative reason
for the failure of formal accounts of the relation between some pairs of successive
scientific theories. That Duhem was also the source of Feyerabends second rea-
son is not surprising given that Duhem discussed the second reason (incommen-
surability) forty pages before he discussed the first reason (logical inconsistency)
in Duhem (1954 [1906]).
After explaining that the meaning of a term depends on the theory to which it be-
longs, and that a consequence of theoretical advance is meaning change, Duhem
continued:
If the theories admitted by this physicist are those we accept, and if we agree to65 Fey
Univer
a hand
and th
made ifollow the same rules in the interpretation of the same phenomena, we speak
the same language and can understand each other. But that is not always the case.
It is not so when we discuss the experiments of a physicist who does not belong
to our school; and it is especially not so when we discuss the experiments of a
physicist separated from us by fifty years, a century, or two centuries. (Ibid.,
p. 159; italics inserted)erabends personal copy of (Duhem 1908 [1906]) can be found in the Philosophical Archive at the
sity of Konstanz, Germany. It is stamped with Feyerabends name and 1940s Vienna address, and
written date suggests that he acquired it on or before 04.05.1949. The margins are heavily noted,
e fact that Feyerabend sometimes used his German shorthand further suggests that these notes were
n the late 1940s.
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ably familiar. It represents a basic point that both Feyerabend and Kuhn made
with their notions of incommensurability.66 In Feyerabends copy of Duhem
(1954 [1906], p. 210), he marked this passage, and placed a small star in the
margin.
Furthermore, Duhem continued:66 On
becaus
theorie
rejecte
p. 233
surabi
1998).
concer
Rather
from t
67 See
the lim
advanc. . . How many scientific discussions there are in which each of the contend-
ers claims to have crushed his adversary under the overwhelming testimony
of the facts! . . .How many propositions are regarded as monstrous errors in
the writings of those who have preceded us! We should perhaps commemo-
rate them as great truths if we really wished to enquire into the theories which
gave their propositions their true meaning . . . (Ibid., pp. 160–161; italics
inserted).Once again, this sounds extremely similar to a number of claims both Feyerabend
and Kuhn made about incommensurability, and once again, this passage is under-
lined in Feyerabends copy of Duhem (1954 [1906], p. 212).
The passage expresses a basic idea behind Feyerabends notion of incommensura-
bility, and one of its major consequences: because the older ideas are misunderstood,
as a result of taking them out of the theoretical context that provides them with their
correct content, disputants misunderstand each other, both claiming to have the
facts on their side. As is well known, both Kuhn and Feyerabend repeatedly argued
this point, and claimed that in such a situation, even empirical arguments can be-
come circular.67
Feyerabend developed thesis I, and consequently the incommensurability thesis,
from Duhem. Duhem had already set out the ideas: (a) that the meanings of obser-
vational terms are dependent on the theories to which they belong; (b) that meaning
change, even of observational terms, is a consequence of theoretical advance; and (c)
that scientists have difficulties understanding members of different schools as well as
those separated from them by 50, 100, or even 200 years because of meaning changee could argue that Duhems ideas do not really match those of either Kuhn or Feyerabend,
e Duhem suggested that the vocabulary of older theories can be translated into that of newer
s (Duhem, 1954 [1906], p. 160). However, such an argument fails to consider that Feyerabend
d the idea that incommensurability implies untranslatability as late as 1970 (Feyerabend, 1970d,
), and Kuhn only began to use a special notion of untranslatability to explicate incommen-
lity in 1969. For excellent discussions, see Hoyningen-Huene (1993), pp. 213 ff.; Sankey (1997,
Thus, Duhems remarks concerning translatability do not undermine the similarity to his views
ning incommensurability set out in 1962 by Kuhn and in the 1950s and 1960s by Feyerabend.
they bolster my point that Ajdukiewiczs problem of untranslatability is significantly different
he Duhem/Feyerabend notion of incommensurability.
, for example, Feyerabend (1965b), p. 152 and Kuhn (1970a [1962]), p. 94. Duhem also recognized
itations of logic for determining the outcome of theoretical disputes in the course of scientific
e (1954 [1906], p. 218; cf. Kuhn, 1970a [1962], p. 94).
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ited to Kuhn and Feyerabend in 1962.68
There are two main differences between Feyerabend and Duhems notions of
incommensurability. First, Feyerabend emphasized that incommensurability only
occurs when fundamental theories change, as only they affect our ontology; that
is, only when theoretical transitions result in a new conception of reality.69 Sec-
ond, unlike Duhem, Feyerabends conception of incommensurability is best
understood in the context of his repeated attacks on various forms of conceptual
conservativism.
If the notion of incommensurability in Feyerabends early philosophy is based on
the idea that scientific terms receive their meaning from the theories to which they
belong, and these meanings change in the course of theoretical advance (as I have
argued that it should), then the origins of Feyerabends idea of incommensurability
should be traced directly back at least to Pierre Duhem (1954 [1906]).7010. Conclusions
In the first half of the last century, the idea of incommensurability was in the air.
Various different versions of the basic insight that logical relations are inadequate for
capturing the relations between certain pairs of successive scientific theories because
meanings change in the course of theoretical advance had been proposed by Duhem,
Ajdukiewicz, Fleck, and Polanyi—before the more famous introductions of the term
incommensurable by Kuhn and Feyerabend in 1962. All of these individuals con-
tributed in their own ways to the development of the contemporary notions of
incommensurability in the philosophy of science.
Kuhn and Feyerabends developments of their notions of incommensurability
differed significantly. Kuhn developed his notion of incommensurability out of
studies in the history of science, and he was directly influenced by Fleck and
Polanyi, and perhaps indirectly (through Fleck) by Ajdukiewicz. Feyerabend,
on the other hand, developed his notion of incommensurability in the late
1940s and early 1950s through his studies of the bearing of the psychology of68 There are a number of other significant similarities in Duhem and Feyerabends ideas. The most
significant is the issue of realism. Both Duhem and Feyerabend understood realism as a normative ideal;
that is, as the idea that our theories should be interpreted as attempts to interpret experience realistically,
and not as a factual claim about the status of scientific knowledge. Moreover, both Duhem and
Feyerabend used the same methodological argument in favor of such a normative realism—that by
encouraging competition, it better promotes progress than instrumentalism. For details, see Oberheim
(forthcoming).
69 As Matteo Collodel has emphasized in remarks on a draft of this paper, it is this aspect of ontological
change in Feyerabends early incommensurability thesis (and not a contextual theory of meaning) that
may be correctly attributable to Feyerabends discussions with Anscombe.
70 This also supports Giedymins claim concerning LeRoys contribution to the notion of incommen-
surability, as at the outset of the chapter in which Duhem develops the notion of incommensurability, he
acknowledged LeRoy as the source of his ideas. See Duhem (1954 [1906]), p. 144 n. 1.
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Köhler, and the idea from Gestalt psychology that observation is theory-laden,
heavily influenced both Kuhn and Feyerabends developments of their notions
of incommensurability.
Feyerabend used his notion of incommensurability to mean that two fundamental
theories are conceptually incompatible. The basic idea is that because the meanings,
even of observational terms, are determined by the theories to which they belong,
when there is theory change, there are meaning changes that can result in a new con-
ception of reality. As a consequence, logical relations cannot correctly characterize
the relationship between certain pairs of successive scientific theories.
Initially, Feyerabend drew his notion of incommensurability directly from Du-
hem. In discussions with Anscombe and Bohr in the early 1950s, he began to develop
the idea as an attack on various forms of conceptual conservativism. He used the
idea to attack many different forms of conceptual conservativism throughout his
early philosophy. One could even say that Feyerabends early philosophy was a series
of critiques of various forms of conceptual conservativism on the basis of Duhems
insight that in the course of scientific advance, older ideas have been replaced by
newer, incommensurable ones.Acknowledgements
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Feyerabend, P. (forthcoming [1971/1975]). Einführung in die Naturphilosophie (An introduction to the
philosophy of nature) (H. Heit, & E. Oberheim, Eds.). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
Feyerabend, P., & Maxwell, G. (Eds.). (1966).Mind, matter and method: Essays in the philosophy of science
in honour of Herbert Feigl. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Fleck, L. (1979). In T. Trenn, & R. Merton (Eds.), Genesis and development of a scientific fact. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press. (First published 1935)
Fleck, L. (1980). Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache. Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp. (First published 1935)
Fleck, L. (1986a). Some specific features of the medical way of thinking. In R. Cohen, & T. Schnelle (Eds.),
Cognition and fact: Materials on Ludwik Fleck (pp. 39–46). Boston: D. Reidel. (First published 1927)
Fleck, L. (1986b). Scientific observation and perception in general. In R. Cohen, & T. Schnelle (Eds.),
Cognition and fact: Materials on Ludwik Fleck (pp. 59–78). Boston: D. Reidel. (First published 1935)
Fleck, L. (1986c). The problem of epistemology. In R. Cohen, & T. Schnelle (Eds.), Cognition and fact:
Materials on Ludwik Fleck (pp. 79–112). Boston: D. Reidel. (First published 1936)
Giedymin, J. (1970). The paradox of meaning variance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 21,
257–268.
Giedymin, J. (1982). Science and convention: Essays on Henri Poincarés philosophy of science and the
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